Background
Veli Morina, a stone mechanic employed by nonparty Harvard Maintenance, was injured while working in the lobby of 250 Broadway in lower Manhattan. He and two coworkers were engaged in cleaning and replacing lobby stone panels when one coworker lost his grip while attempting to place a 350-pound stone panel onto an A-frame dolly. The panel struck Morina on the head. Morina sued four defendants: 250 Broadway Owner Corp. (Owner), the building’s title holder; 250 Broadway Associates Corp. (Associates), which had acquired an ownership interest through a 2019 merger with Owner; 250 Broadway Condominium (Condominium), which maintained the lobby; and Amtrust Realty Corp., the building manager, which had directly contracted with Harvard Maintenance for the stone panel work.
Each defendant moved to dismiss, arguing it was not a proper “owner” or “statutory agent” under Labor Law § 240(1). All four defendants also challenged the merits, arguing that Morina walked into the panel rather than having it fall on him. Supreme Court granted Morina summary judgment on § 240(1) liability and denied the defendants’ dismissal motion. The First Department unanimously affirmed.
The Court’s Holding
Owner liability: Associates argued that Owner Corp. was the sole titleholder and that Associates itself was not an owner. The court rejected this: Associates had acquired an ownership interest in the building through its October 2019 merger with Owner Corp. — making it a proper Labor Law § 240(1) defendant under Scaparo v Village of Ilion (13 NY3d 864 [2009]).
Condominium liability: 250 Broadway Condominium maintained responsibility for the lobby — the precise area where the accident occurred — and therefore had “the right to insist that proper safety practices were followed.” Under settled First Department precedent, that right to insist on safety compliance makes Condominium an “owner” for purposes of § 240(1), even absent direct supervision of the work.
Building manager liability: Amtrust Realty Corp. directly contracted with Harvard Maintenance to perform the cleaning and stone panel replacement work in the lobby on Owner’s behalf. By contracting for work at the property for the owner’s benefit, and by retaining supervisory authority over the project (even if it did not actually supervise daily), Amtrust qualified as Owner’s “statutory agent” under Labor Law § 240(1). Following Barreto v Board of Mgrs. of 545 W. 110th St. Condominium (234 AD3d 515 [1st Dept 2025]), contracting for the work plus retained supervisory authority is sufficient — direct, hands-on supervision is not required.
Merits: Morina established prima facie § 240(1) liability through evidence that the 350-pound panel fell and struck him because his coworker lost his grip. Defendants’ counter-narrative — that Morina walked into the panel — found no support in the record; the coworker’s affidavit stated the panel “contacted plaintiff on his head,” directly contradicting the defense theory. Defendants’ hearsay evidence from a supervisor (who was not present but claimed a third coworker had described the accident differently) was insufficient to defeat summary judgment as the only opposition evidence. Finally, the court noted that even if Morina had been distracted by his cell phone before the accident, comparative negligence is never a defense to a § 240(1) claim.
Key Takeaways
- A building owner’s successor by merger acquires Labor Law § 240(1) liability along with ownership interests — the title history at closing matters for construction-site liability analysis.
- A condominium that maintains responsibility for the area where accident occurs — even if it did not directly supervise the specific work — is a proper “owner” defendant under § 240(1) because it retains the right to insist on safety compliance.
- A building manager that directly contracts for construction work at the property on behalf of the owner, and retains supervisory authority over the project, qualifies as a “statutory agent” under § 240(1) regardless of whether it exercised that authority in practice.
- Hearsay statements from a supervisor who did not witness the accident cannot, standing alone, defeat a plaintiff’s prima facie § 240(1) summary judgment motion.
- Comparative negligence — including a worker’s use of a cell phone — is not a defense to strict liability under Labor Law § 240(1).
Why It Matters
Morina is a useful teaching case on the outer boundaries of who qualifies as an “owner” or “statutory agent” under Labor Law § 240(1) — New York’s strict-liability statute for elevation-related construction accidents. Defense practitioners frequently attempt to parse corporate structures to isolate liability in one entity. This decision demonstrates that successor-by-merger entities, condominiums with area responsibility, and building managers who contract for the work all face exposure, regardless of day-to-day involvement in site operations.
For plaintiffs’ counsel, the case also reinforces two important evidentiary points at summary judgment: (1) a coworker affidavit that directly supports the plaintiff’s account of how the accident happened will typically be sufficient to establish prima facie liability, and (2) hearsay from a non-witness supervisor relaying what another worker purportedly said about the accident is not competent summary judgment evidence when used as the sole opposition proof. Combined with the reiteration that comparative fault does not limit § 240(1) recovery, the decision reflects the First Department’s consistent application of the statute’s strict-liability framework in favor of injured construction workers.