Background
Dijalma Neto, a carpenter employed by Magellan Concrete Structures, was working on a building construction project in Brooklyn at premises owned by Buddies Bro, LLC, where Townhouse Builders, Inc. served as the general contractor. On the date of his accident, Neto was engaged in “stripping”—removing the wooden formwork used as a base to pour a concrete second-floor ceiling. To reach his work area, Neto climbed down a cement column on the exterior of the building using scissor clamps attached to the column. He slipped while descending and fell; his personal fall arrest system engaged, preventing him from hitting the ground, but he struck the exterior wall and lost consciousness.
Neto sued under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) and common-law negligence. He moved for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action—the Scaffold Law, which imposes strict nondelegable liability on owners and general contractors for elevation-related injuries. The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted that branch of the motion. The defendants appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Appellate Division reversed. While it agreed that Neto made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment—he was injured due to the defendants’ failure to provide scaffolding or a ladder suitable for working on the exterior of the building—the defendants raised a triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motion.
Labor Law § 240(1), the Scaffold Law, imposes absolute liability for gravity-related accidents, but that liability does not attach where the worker is the sole proximate cause of his or her own injuries. Although comparative negligence is not a defense under § 240(1), a plaintiff cannot recover if adequate safety devices were provided, the worker knew of and was expected to use them, chose for no good reason not to use them, and that choice was the only proximate cause of the injury. Here, the defendants submitted evidence that they had provided Neto with a six-foot ladder for the exterior work, that Neto may have known the ladder was available, and that Neto nonetheless chose to climb the scissor clamps attached to the cement column near the building’s edge. That showing—disputed as it was—was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Neto was the sole proximate cause of his fall.
Because the defendants successfully raised the triable issue in opposition, the court held that the Supreme Court should have denied summary judgment and allowed the sole-proximate-cause defense to go to a jury.
Key Takeaways
- A prima facie § 240(1) case can be overcome at the summary judgment stage if the defendant produces evidence that (1) an adequate safety device was furnished, (2) the worker knew of or had access to it, (3) the worker inexplicably chose not to use it, and (4) that choice was the only cause of the injury.
- Providing a six-foot ladder for exterior column work—even where that ladder may not have been immediately adjacent to the plaintiff—can be sufficient to raise the sole-proximate-cause triable issue at the pleadings stage, particularly where the worker instead chose to use unconventional equipment like scissor clamps.
- Plaintiffs moving for summary judgment on § 240(1) must anticipate and address the sole-proximate-cause defense in their moving papers; courts will look hard at whether the worker had and rejected safer options.
- Defense counsel should document pre-accident safety equipment availability and any witness testimony about the plaintiff’s knowledge of that equipment to preserve the sole-proximate-cause defense for trial.
Why It Matters
New York’s Scaffold Law (Labor Law § 240(1)) is one of the most powerful tools available to injured construction workers in the country—it imposes strict liability on property owners and general contractors and does not permit comparative-fault reduction of damages. The sole-proximate-cause defense is the primary counterweight: if the worker chose to ignore available safety equipment and that choice alone caused the accident, liability does not attach. This decision illustrates just how difficult that defense is to prove at the summary judgment stage—and how fact-intensive the inquiry is. For plaintiffs’ counsel, the decision is a reminder to anticipate and rebut evidence of available-but-unused safety devices in the initial motion. For owners and contractors, it shows that careful documentation of the safety equipment provided on the jobsite—and of the plaintiff’s knowledge of and access to that equipment—can convert a seemingly certain § 240(1) verdict into a triable issue, preserving the defense for a jury.