Background
In August 2021, Tanner Smith—a fourteen-year-old student and football player at Western Guilford High School—went to a COVID-19 testing clinic set up at another school in the Guilford County Schools system. The clinic was operated jointly by the school district and Old North State Medical Society, Inc. (“ONSMS”), a private medical non-profit. While Tanner waited, clinic workers attempted to reach his mother, Emily Happel, for consent to administer a COVID-19 vaccine. After failing to reach her, a clinic worker told another to “give it to him anyway.” Tanner told workers he only wanted a COVID-19 test and did not want a vaccine. A worker nonetheless injected him with a Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine over his express objection and without parental consent.
Emily Happel sued on her own behalf and on Tanner’s behalf, asserting battery and state constitutional claims under N.C. Const. art. I, §§ 1, 13, and 19 for violations of parental rights and bodily integrity against both the Guilford County Board of Education and ONSMS. The trial court dismissed all claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the broad immunity provided by the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act). The North Carolina Supreme Court granted review and reversed in part—holding that the PREP Act covers only tort injuries, not constitutional violations, and remanding two questions to the Court of Appeals: (1) whether ONSMS was a “state actor” for purposes of a state constitutional (“Corum”) claim, and (2) whether plaintiffs had an adequate state remedy. Happel v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 387 N.C. 186, 913 S.E.2d 174 (2025).
A Corum claim—the mechanism for vindicating state constitutional rights when no other adequate remedy exists—requires: (1) a state actor, (2) a colorable constitutional violation, and (3) no adequate alternative state remedy. The Supreme Court had already confirmed that parental rights and bodily integrity are protected liberty interests under the North Carolina Law of the Land Clause, so only the state-actor and adequate-remedy prongs remained on remand. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992).
The Court’s Holding
On remand, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals (Wood, J., joined by Collins and Carpenter, JJ.) reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. On the state-actor question, the court acknowledged that North Carolina precedent had not yet defined when a private party qualifies as a “state actor” for Corum purposes. Drawing on analogues in federal law—particularly the “joint engagement” doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the “totality of the circumstances” approach used in Fourth Amendment state-action analysis—the court held that Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient. The complaint alleged that Guilford County Schools and ONSMS jointly operated the clinic as a joint venture, giving ONSMS the mantle of state authority. Taking those allegations as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court concluded “there are legal theories under which ONSMS could be viewed as a state actor.”
On the adequate-remedy question, the court held that the PREP Act’s sweeping immunity removes all tort pathways for relief—foreclosing the alternative remedies that ordinarily take Corum claims off the table. Because the PREP Act deprived Plaintiffs of any opportunity to “enter the courthouse doors and present” a state-law tort claim, there was no adequate state remedy, and Corum was the only avenue available. The court reversed and remanded to the trial court, which must determine on a full evidentiary record whether Defendants were “clothed with the authority of the State” for Corum purposes, and if so, whether the claims are meritorious.
Key Takeaways
- The federal PREP Act immunizes defendants only from tort liability, not from North Carolina constitutional claims; healthcare providers who receive PREP Act immunity can still face Corum claims for constitutional violations.
- This is the first North Carolina appellate opinion to define the “state actor” element of a Corum claim. The court held that a private entity acting as a “willful participant in joint activity” with a state actor—borrowing from § 1983 and Fourth Amendment doctrine—may qualify, at least at the pleading stage.
- When PREP Act immunity forecloses all tort claims, it simultaneously eliminates any “adequate state remedy,” satisfying the third Corum element and keeping constitutional claims alive.
- North Carolina parents have a constitutional right under the Law of the Land Clause to control their children’s medical treatment; competent minors have a corresponding right to refuse non-mandatory medical procedures. Both rights were recognized by the NC Supreme Court in the prior appeal.
- Practitioners handling school-based healthcare programs, vaccination clinics operated jointly by public entities and private providers, or any PREP Act-covered activity should evaluate potential Corum exposure from the outset, since PREP Act immunity does not provide a complete shield.
Why It Matters
For healthcare organizations, school districts, and government agencies that partnered on COVID-era vaccination programs—or that maintain joint operations today—Happel on remand reshapes the liability landscape. The joint-venture structure that made these programs efficient now potentially exposes private providers to NC constitutional claims that PREP Act immunity cannot reach. The court’s adoption of federal § 1983 state-action doctrine into NC Corum jurisprudence also expands the universe of entities that must consider constitutional exposure when operating in collaboration with the state.
More broadly, the decision reinforces that Corum claims function as a constitutional backstop: when the legislature’s immunity choices leave a rights-holder with no door into the courthouse for a genuine constitutional violation, Corum remains available. NC litigators representing clients injured by government-adjacent entities should assess both the Corum elements and whether applicable immunity statutes inadvertently satisfy the “no adequate remedy” prong by blocking all tort routes to relief.