Applying State v. Chambers, the Supreme Court rejected a case-by-case constitutional test. The statute is constitutional when its two safeguards are observed: the alternate must not have discussed the case and the reconstituted jury must begin deliberations anew. The Court reversed on substitution, held the suppression issue unpreserved, and remanded for remaining issues.
The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that McGirt knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived counsel. The written requests, extended history with appointed counsel, and trial court’s questioning showed an unequivocal choice and awareness of the consequences. Because waiver resolved the appeal, the majority did not need to decide forfeiture by misconduct.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Because the record available during the direct appeal was adequate to litigate the asserted deficiencies and prejudice, Gupton was in a position to raise the claims then. His later motion could therefore be rejected under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1419 rather than decided through a new evidentiary proceeding.
The Supreme Court narrowed the reach of the per se-prejudice rule associated with State v. Harbison. Reading Florida v. Nixon, Strickland, and Cronic together, it held that most claims based on an unconsented concession require proof of deficient performance and prejudice; automatic prejudice is reserved for circumstances in which the defendant is entirely surprised by counsel’s concession. It reversed the remand for an evidentiary hearing.
The Supreme Court held that the pleaded facts were sufficient to proceed on a narrow constitutional theory: a school board may not be deliberately indifferent to extreme in-school conduct that deprives a student of equal access to a sound basic education. The Court also found immediate appellate jurisdiction based on the risk of inconsistent verdicts, reversed the contrary ruling, and remanded.