Case Westminster City Council v Gems House Residences Chiltern Street Limited & Anor Court Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (United […]
Case Point Village Development Limited v Dunnes Stores Unlimited Company Court Court of Appeal (Ireland) Date Decided 20 July 2026
The Appellate Division held that an electrical contractor who signed a final payment release using ‘any and all claims and demands’ language was barred from pursuing a $140,000 retainer-fee claim — even though the project lacked a formal written contract.
Second Department affirms denial of summary judgment to marine cargo insurer: typewritten ‘floor to floor’ notation in certificate of insurance raised triable issue of fact as to whether coverage extended through forklift delivery to warehouse floor, beyond standard warehouse-to-warehouse clause.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a $26,633 summary judgment for a consultant who claimed she was owed two months of “monthly retainer fees” during a sixty-day notice period in which she performed no work. Reading the contract as a whole, the court held that “retainer fee” does not mean availability payment; the early-termination clause—which conditioned payment on “work completed through the end of the notice period”—controlled. Because the consultant performed no work after termination, Fisher Consulting owed nothing. Summary judgment for the defendant was ordered on remand.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the invalidation of non-compete agreements barring two nurse practitioners from “engaging in the practice of Medicine” for one year within Robeson County and a 35-mile radius. Writing for the majority, Judge Griffin held the covenants overbroad in their terms despite reasonable time and geographic limits, void against public policy, and not salvageable through blue-penciling under North Carolina’s strict severance doctrine. The 2–1 decision—Chief Judge Dillon dissenting—clarifies that healthcare non-competes must track the specific work performed, not broadly prohibit all medical practice.
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s order enforcing a post-divorce mortgage-payment obligation, holding that Provision 2 of the parties’ Modification supports at least three reasonable interpretations—property-specific, region-limited, and location-neutral—and is therefore ambiguous as a matter of law, requiring remand for an evidentiary hearing on the parties’ intent before the provision can be enforced against Stephen Schmidt.
In the companion appeal to the WDF v. Pegno construction dispute over a Newtown Creek project liquidating agreement, the Appellate Division, Second Department affirms denial of summary judgment to the joint venture defendants on their release defense, holding that the release clause is ambiguous as to claims arising from the post-execution City settlement.
In companion decisions on cross-appeals, the Appellate Division, Second Department holds that the release clause in a construction subcontract liquidating agreement is ambiguous as to whether it bars claims arising from the joint venture’s post-execution settlement with the City of New York—leaving the scope of the release and the parties’ cooperation obligations for trial.
The Appellate Division, Second Department reverses denial of summary judgment and orders specific performance of a commercial real estate contract, holding that docketed Environmental Control Board judgments are liens that the seller must discharge at or before closing under a contract requiring conveyance free of all encumbrances.
The Fourth Department affirms that a merchant cash advance structured as a revenue purchase agreement is not a usurious loan under New York law, applying the three-factor test of reconciliation provisions, finite term, and bankruptcy recourse.
The Fourth Department upholds Zurich’s duty to defend Erie County but reverses summary judgment against Selective Insurance, finding contract ambiguity about whether park paving work fell within the contractor’s additional-insured obligation.
The First Department affirmed a $3 million summary judgment in lieu of complaint, holding that a Rescission and Settlement Agreement that defendants contractually designated as “an Agreement for the payment of money only” qualified for CPLR 3213 treatment and that a Delaware non-reliance clause barred defendants’ fraudulent inducement defense.