The published majority agreed the townhome was technically a mixed asset because the husband acquired ownership before marriage, but affirmed the distribution. The evidence attributed zero percent of the separation-date value to a proven separate component and 100 percent to the marital component. A partial dissent would have vacated for further classification and valuation.
The published decision reversed every termination ground. Findings did not support neglect; the children had not been removed in the manner required for the reasonable-progress ground; and no case plan had been imposed. A judge’s memory and independent investigation were not evidence and compromised the neutral decisionmaker role.
The published opinion affirmed. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported willful abandonment, and the best-interest findings addressed adoption, permanence, the children’s bond with the aunt, and their lack of a significant bond with the mother. The guardian ad litem’s different recommendation was relevant but not controlling.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of ownership to the woman. Evidence supported donative intent and delivery, and credibility findings belonged to the trial court. Physical delivery did not require the donor to avoid all later possession or care while the parties cohabited; continued shared contact with gifted property did not divest the recipient’s title.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Past neglect may inform whether future neglect is likely, but it does not end the inquiry when the children are not in the parent’s custody. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported positive changes and the district court’s determination that repetition of neglect was not sufficiently likely. An isolated positive THC test did not compel a different result in light of the broader record.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The prior recusal applied to the judge who had entered it and did not bar a different judge from hearing the remanded matter. Unchallenged and supported findings showed a living environment injurious to the children’s welfare, including repeated exposure to potentially harmful situations and failure to correct the conduct. Those findings supported adjudication of all three children as neglected.
The Court of Appeals found no error. The trial evidence supported an inference that Spencer knew the store and employee schedules, positioned himself for a private attack, and waited for the victims to leave. Evidence that he changed clothes, misled his girlfriend, and disposed of the weapon supported flight even though he later appeared near officers. The evidence also did not require a second-degree murder instruction.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a DWI/fleeing-to-elude conviction, holding that the trial court did not err under Rule 404(b) when it allowed the State to cross-examine the defendant about a prior urban police encounter that contradicted his trial testimony that he “would have pulled over” if approached in the city, and that the Rule 403 determination did not rise to an abuse of discretion despite the evidence’s limited probative value and high prejudice potential.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for secret peeping, second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor, and third-degree sexual exploitation of a minor arising from hidden charging-block cameras installed in bathrooms, holding that the 1978 “intent to invade privacy” gloss from In re Banks does not apply to the elements of the current N.C.G.S. § 14-202(f) felony secret-peeping statute.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the superior court and reinstated Henderson County’s grant of a special use permit for a residential addiction-recovery facility, holding that the Board of Adjustment properly classified the facility as an Assisted Living Residence because the county code’s use table enumerated ALR but not Mental Health Facility, and clarifying that a quasi-judicial body’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for due process violation (on exclusion) or competent-evidence support (on admission)—not as errors of law under the Rules of Evidence.