California appellate court reverses juvenile’s commitment to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility because the minor’s most recent offense by date was not a qualifying crime under section 707(b).
California appellate court rules that defendants must be allowed to argue aggravating sentencing factors to a jury, reversing an upper-term firearm enhancement where the trial court denied closing argument on those factors.
The Second District vacated a murder conviction because the trial court improperly added and underlined ‘unintentionally’ in the voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, misleading the jury about when heat of passion applies.
The Second District holds that when a trial court finds a defendant eligible and suitable for mental-health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, requiring a no-contest plea as the price of receiving the same treatment via probation directly conflicts with the statute’s purpose.
The Second District affirms a first-degree murder conviction, holding the trial court had no duty to instruct on attempted murder where the defendant’s brutal attack was a substantial factor in the victim’s death even though the victim had grave preexisting heart and liver disease.
The Second District holds that felony false imprisonment based on menace does not require a threat of force greater than necessary to effectuate restraint — a doctrinal clarification that affirms a domestic-violence conviction.
When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.75, the trial court may reimpose an upper term using aggravating facts the defendant already stipulated to — no new jury findings required.
The Second District holds that hearsay testimony from a preliminary hearing is admissible at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing if it qualifies as a declaration against penal interest — affirming denial of a gang-shooting resentencing petition.
Second District holds that vacatur of a murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6 does not establish an “erroneous conviction” entitling the former defendant to compensation under section 4900, because Senate Bill 1437’s narrowing of murder liability was a legislative act o
Second District holds that Penal Code section 3051 youth offender parole hearings are constitutional as applied to forcible sex offenders sentenced under section 667.6’s full consecutive sentence scheme, finding that section 3051 did not improperly amend Proposition 83 (Jessica’s Law).
Second District rejects facial Second Amendment challenges to California’s prohibitions on assault weapons, short-barreled shotguns, silencers, and large-capacity magazines, holding that these regulations survive scrutiny under Heller, Bruen, and the common use test.
Second District holds that a jury’s not-true findings on personal firearm use and a robbery special circumstance do not collaterally estop a resentencing court from finding the defendant was the actual killer in a Penal Code section 1172.6 hearing, applying People v. Santamaria and joining Peo
Second District grants habeas petition vacating murder conviction where prosecutor failed to correct false eyewitness testimony about prior police identifications and defense counsel failed to impeach with the witnesses’ actual statements, applying the Supreme Court’s recent Glossip v. O
Second District reverses first and second degree murder convictions because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding under Evidence Code section 352 a contemporaneous handwritten note relevant to the defendant’s provocation defense.
Second District holds that under Penal Code section 1237.1 a trial court retains jurisdiction during a pending appeal to correct presentence custody credit errors, and modifies the judgment to award two additional days of credit.
Second District holds that a defendant in custody in another county did not willfully fail to appear for sentencing and that uncertified records from a Fresno court were inadmissible to prove a Cruz waiver violation.
Second District affirms convictions for the murder of a Pomona police officer and a separate assault, holding that hot pursuit and concern for family members justified the warrantless entry, but remands to correct determinate-term sentencing under Penal Code section 1170.1.
Second District affirms denial of mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, with a notable concurrence sharply criticizing a recent Fourth District decision that overturned a similar denial.
Second District grants writ vacating mental health diversion in a violent hate-crime case, holding that the trial court must consider evidence of past treatment noncompliance when applying the public safety prong of Penal Code section 1001.36.