The published majority agreed the townhome was technically a mixed asset because the husband acquired ownership before marriage, but affirmed the distribution. The evidence attributed zero percent of the separation-date value to a proven separate component and 100 percent to the marital component. A partial dissent would have vacated for further classification and valuation.
The published panel affirmed dismissal of the first claim and held a third claim time-barred under G.S. 36C-6-604(a), but reversed summary judgment on the second claim and remanded it. Because the ruling on the third claim resolved that controversy, the defendants’ limitations cross-appeal no longer had a practical effect and was dismissed as moot.
The published majority affirmed summary judgment and the fee orders. The insurer’s unjustified refusal to defend left it responsible for the resulting judgment, and the trial court acted within its discretion in setting attorney fees rather than using the requested contingency-based figure. With no additional proven injury, nominal UDTPA damages were proper. One judge dissented in part on notice and prejudice.
The published panel affirmed summary judgment against dissolution. The record showed the LLC could continue operating consistently with its agreement, and liquidation was not necessary to protect the member’s rights under G.S. 57D-6-02. A trial judge’s oral reference to nonexistent motions did not displace the signed written orders.
The published panel affirmed. Medicaid participation and audit rules did not make the asserted notice defects jurisdictional, and the Department’s notices identified data analysis as the ground for prepayment review while explaining the compliance standards applied. Federal rules did not require disclosure of audit details that could compromise program-integrity work.
A divided published decision reversed partial summary judgment. No implied contract of hire existed between the worker and Johnson Concrete, so neither special-employment doctrine applied. The site operator could not claim exclusivity without the burdens and evidence of an employment relationship, and the civil case could proceed.
The published decision reversed every termination ground. Findings did not support neglect; the children had not been removed in the manner required for the reasonable-progress ground; and no case plan had been imposed. A judge’s memory and independent investigation were not evidence and compromised the neutral decisionmaker role.
The published opinion affirmed. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported willful abandonment, and the best-interest findings addressed adoption, permanence, the children’s bond with the aunt, and their lack of a significant bond with the mother. The guardian ad litem’s different recommendation was relevant but not controlling.
The published decision affirmed denial of dismissal. Intent for assault and battery concerns the unwanted contact or apprehension, not an intent to produce the precise resulting injury. Because the complaint alleged an intentional strike, the Pleasant exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity applied despite the negligence label.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of New-Indy’s venue motion. The agreement was formed when the North Carolina representative approved the purchase order, so it was entered in North Carolina. Even assuming incorporation, G.S. 22B-3 made the out-of-state forum clause void and unenforceable.
The Court of Appeals remanded for additional findings. A substantial change in circumstances must affect the child, and a relocation decision requires findings that permit review of advantages, parental motives, compliance with visitation, and the practicality of preserving the other parent’s relationship. The order supplied a visitation schedule but did not explain the claimed educational benefit, the child’s relationship with the stepfather, or
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It held that specifically challenged provisions using open-ended terms such as significant impacts did not provide adequate objective guidance and were unclear. The Rules Review Commission abandoned objections it failed to develop on appeal, but the trial court also erred by treating fourteen objections as beyond the Commission’s scope without determining which provisions met
The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of ownership to the woman. Evidence supported donative intent and delivery, and credibility findings belonged to the trial court. Physical delivery did not require the donor to avoid all later possession or care while the parties cohabited; continued shared contact with gifted property did not divest the recipient’s title.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Past neglect may inform whether future neglect is likely, but it does not end the inquiry when the children are not in the parent’s custody. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported positive changes and the district court’s determination that repetition of neglect was not sufficiently likely. An isolated positive THC test did not compel a different result in light of the broader record.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The prior recusal applied to the judge who had entered it and did not bar a different judge from hearing the remanded matter. Unchallenged and supported findings showed a living environment injurious to the children’s welfare, including repeated exposure to potentially harmful situations and failure to correct the conduct. Those findings supported adjudication of all three children as neglected.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the defendants’ appeal as interlocutory. The attachment did not essentially shut down the defendants’ business, applied to a single North Carolina asset, allowed a sale so long as proceeds remained secured, and could be discharged by bond. Because the defendants did not identify an irreparable injury that would be lost before final judgment, the order did not affect a substantial right supporting immediate review.
The Court of Appeals found no error. The trial evidence supported an inference that Spencer knew the store and employee schedules, positioned himself for a private attack, and waited for the victims to leave. Evidence that he changed clothes, misled his girlfriend, and disposed of the weapon supported flight even though he later appeared near officers. The evidence also did not require a second-degree murder instruction.
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial. Allowing thirteen jurors to deliberate violated both the governing statute and the North Carolina Constitution’s twelve-juror guarantee. The judge’s mixed instruction to restart but await directions to continue or begin was not the clear, unequivocal safeguard the law requires. The error was both structural in character and prejudicial, so the court did not reach the sentencing issue.
The Court of Appeals found no error. Counsel did not concede guilt to the Pender County charges; the argument attempted to connect incriminating statements to different allegations and focus the jury on the State’s burden. The on-record discussion showed Benson knowingly accepted that strategy. The court also held that the substantial evidence of guilt defeated any showing of Strickland prejudice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Rule 60 relief. The trial court investigated the circumstances, assessed credibility, considered the available Rule 60 grounds, and could find that the record did not establish a void judgment or extraordinary circumstances. The appellate court emphasized its deferential abuse-of-discretion review and declined to substitute its credibility judgment for the trial court’s.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Although evidence supported some findings about the witnesses’ conduct, the supported findings did not show a flagrant constitutional violation that irreparably prejudiced Cuadra’s preparation of his defense with no available remedy other than dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings that may include a new trial; a concurrence emphasized the availability of lesser sanctions such as a mistrial.
The published panel reversed and ordered enforcement of the agreed Michigan forum. Because the subcontract involved interstate commerce, the Federal Arbitration Act applied and preempted North Carolina’s contrary forum restriction. General equitable concerns and efficiency could not override the FAA’s command that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms.
The published opinion remanded for the trial court to determine whether counsel performed deficiently and, if so, whether those deficiencies deprived the mother of a fair hearing. The existing appellate record did not permit the Court of Appeals to resolve the fact-sensitive ineffective-assistance questions itself. A separate concurrence elaborated on the standards the trial court should use on remand.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a $26,633 summary judgment for a consultant who claimed she was owed two months of “monthly retainer fees” during a sixty-day notice period in which she performed no work. Reading the contract as a whole, the court held that “retainer fee” does not mean availability payment; the early-termination clause—which conditioned payment on “work completed through the end of the notice period”—controlled. Because the consultant performed no work after termination, Fisher Consulting owed nothing. Summary judgment for the defendant was ordered on remand.