The Second Department dismissed claims against a notary and title company after an impostor conveyed another person’s property using identification that was not obviously false.
The Second Department upheld dismissal of a mortgage foreclosure after the lender waited roughly 15 years to seek more time for service and offered no excuse for the delay.
The Second Department enforced redline deletions from a construction indemnity clause, excluding purely economic losses while leaving consequential security costs for trial.
The Second Department held that a lender’s voluntary discontinuance did not reset an accelerated mortgage debt’s limitations period under the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act.
The Second Department held that filing an order to show cause on NYSCEF did not satisfy Lien Law § 59’s personal-service requirement for vacating a mechanic’s-lien bond.
The Second Department held that a home builder plausibly alleged that the parties’ course of conduct modified written change-order requirements, preserving its lien and contract claims.
The Second Department entered judgment on a $300,000 construction loan because the signer never disclosed that he purportedly acted for the property-owning LLC.
The Second Department held reverse-mortgage owners equitably estopped from asserting limitations where repeated occupancy certifications caused the lender’s delay.
The Second Department upheld rescission of homeowner policies where the application described a one-family home but the property contained three separate dwelling units.
The Second Department held that a lender’s second foreclosure action, filed without leave, discontinued its earlier action by operation of RPAPL 1301(3), preventing later restoration.
The Second Department applied New York’s Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act to hold that a voluntary discontinuance did not reset the six-year limitations period after mortgage acceleration.
The Second Department held that a school district could not recast an architect’s alleged contractual nonperformance as negligence or fraud, and could not pursue punitive damages without an independent tort.
The Second Department vacated a commercial foreclosure judgment because a bank officer’s affidavit neither showed personal knowledge of default nor identified and attached the business records on which it relied.