Flouret v. Sagland — Entity-owned land falls outside New York’s heirs-property act
The Second Department held, in a case of first impression, that land wholly owned by a trust and an LLC is not heirs property under RPAPL 993.
The Second Department held, in a case of first impression, that land wholly owned by a trust and an LLC is not heirs property under RPAPL 993.
The Second Department held that FAPA made a 2013 foreclosure untimely based on a 2002 acceleration and allowed reconsideration despite an earlier appeal because the statute changed governing law.
The Second Department reinstated rent-stabilization fraud and rent-freeze claims because the landlord’s conclusory affidavit did not eliminate factual disputes over deregulation and registration practices.
The Second Department held that a deed-theft investigation is in good faith when it has a nontrivial factual basis and reasonable investigative steps, even without probable cause or proof of fraud.
The Second Department allowed rescission where a building was represented as two units and underwriting proof showed three units would have produced a higher premium.
The Second Department held that state cannabis law preempts Riverhead’s expanded school buffer while preserving rational local zoning distinctions.
The Second Department allowed tenants to amend a rent-overcharge class action to pursue the default formula under a newly supported regulatory theory.
The Second Department allowed a neighboring-property negligence claim after an oil spill and fire but dismissed conclusory theories and all claims against the LLC’s manager.
The Second Department enforced a public-construction clause requiring a contractor to perform disputed corrective work first and pursue extra compensation afterward.
The Second Department held an architect’s broad claim waiver void as against public policy while affirming dismissal of fraud allegations that duplicated the parties’ contract dispute.
Second Department affirms dismissal of multiple contract claims by adult care facility operator against village: lease assignment in 2012 stripped plaintiffs of standing to sue for breach of lease and its amendments, and those claims were time-barred in any event.
Appellate Division affirms that mortgage lien is void as against estate property fraudulently transferred through letters of administration obtained by misrepresentation — bona fide encumbrancer doctrine cannot protect a lender when the chain of title flows through a void (not merely voidable) instrument.
Second Department affirms foreclosure summary judgment and rejects criminal usury counterclaim where defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the effective interest rate exceeded the criminal threshold; affirms guaranty enforcement after mortgage assignment.
Second Department affirms DHCR’s use of a prior 2014 rent overcharge order to calculate base date rent in a 2017 rent stabilization complaint, applying deferential Article 78 rational basis review.
Second Department affirms that a HOA lien foreclosure purchaser who recorded its deed after a bank notice of pendency was filed had constructive notice of the bank foreclosure and cannot pursue a quiet title claim under RPAPL article 15.
The Appellate Division, Second Department holds that a trial court exceeded its authority by sua sponte converting a trespass and nuisance action into an RPAPL 881 special proceeding, while affirming the preliminary injunction against renovation work on a plaintiff’s adjoining Brooklyn property wall and rejecting dismissal of the trespass and nuisance claims.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms the annulment of a planning board’s denial of a mixed-use development application, holding that the board’s conclusory determinations—issued only eight months after it issued a SEQRA negative declaration supporting the project—were arbitrary and capricious because the board offered no factual findings or reasoning to explain the reversal.
The Appellate Division, Second Department reverses denial of summary judgment and orders specific performance of a commercial real estate contract, holding that docketed Environmental Control Board judgments are liens that the seller must discharge at or before closing under a contract requiring conveyance free of all encumbrances.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms that a commercial landlord cannot enforce lease provisions requiring a tenant to hold the landlord harmless and bear sole insurance obligations when the landlord’s own negligence caused the tenant’s property damage—here, a roof collapse. General Obligations Law § 5-321 voids the exculpatory clauses.
The Appellate Division, Second Department holds that a property owner whose building partially collapsed due to unsupported neighboring excavation work may amend its complaint under CPLR 3025(b) to add the consulting engineer whose negligence allegedly contributed to the collapse, even though the amendment comes years into the litigation.
The Appellate Division, Second Department partially reverses dismissal of a creditor’s action to unwind allegedly fraudulent conveyances of two Brooklyn properties made seven years after a judgment was entered against the LLC debtor, reinstating causes of action under the Debtor and Creditor Law.
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirms annulment of a DHCR Deputy Commissioner determination that improperly declared a rent-stabilized Brooklyn apartment deregulated through high-rent vacancy, and upholds freezing the legal rent at $1,266 due to the owner’s failure to file annual rent registration statements since 2007.
The Appellate Division, Second Department reverses dismissal of an eminent domain claim against the State, holding that service of the claim on the Attorney General by regular mail — rather than personal service or certified mail — affects only the State’s time to file an appraisal, not the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction over the claim.
The Appellate Division, Second Department dismissed a nuisance suit brought by Forest Hills neighbors against West Side Tennis Club over concert noise at Forest Hills Stadium, holding that the noise is a public rather than private nuisance and that plaintiffs lacked the special injury “different in kind” required to bring a private public-nuisance action.