People v. Merino — False deed may be void without a forged signature
The Second Department held that CPL 420.45 may render a fraudulent deed void from inception after a false-filing conviction even when no signature was forged.
The Second Department held that CPL 420.45 may render a fraudulent deed void from inception after a false-filing conviction even when no signature was forged.
The Second Department held that release on bail pauses CPL 30.30(2)(a)’s 90-day custody clock and that later recommitment resumes, rather than resets, the count.
The Second Department permanently stayed arbitration against a demolition subcontractor whose contract required mediation followed by litigation and contained a void unilateral arbitration option.
The Second Department upheld DHCR’s denial of a rent-stabilization exemption because the owner failed to prove serious deterioration and replacement of 75% of building systems.
The Second Department held that a three-foot fall from a skid-steer step was outside Labor Law § 240(1), while negligence and an illumination-based § 241(6) theory survived.
The Second Department upheld Suffolk County’s DWI vehicle-forfeiture law and found forfeiture of a $21,000 Nissan proportionate to a repeat felony DWI involving extreme speeding.
The Second Department held that J-51 tenants had not proved knowing deregulation fraud on summary judgment, but rejected the landlords’ contractual attorney-fee claim.
The Second Department protected a $3.85 million buyer that reasonably relied on an LLC manager’s apparent authority despite an undisclosed later operating agreement.
The Second Department preserved fraud claims over merchant-cash-advance withdrawals but vacated an injunction because the borrower lacked evidence of likely success and irreparable harm.
The Second Department held that documented reasonable diligence establishes mandatory good cause for a CPLR 306-b extension and that reservice may precede a traverse hearing.
The Second Department held that Allstate owed no defense or indemnity to a driver who was neither the deceased insured’s estate representative nor an authorized temporary custodian.
The Second Department held that an arbitration clause covering ‘legal claims’ did not reach quantum-meruit and constructive-fraud claims.
The Second Department held, in a case of first impression, that land wholly owned by a trust and an LLC is not heirs property under RPAPL 993.
The Second Department held that FAPA made a 2013 foreclosure untimely based on a 2002 acceleration and allowed reconsideration despite an earlier appeal because the statute changed governing law.
A divided Second Department upheld sole custody and termination of scheduled parental access, while the dissent would have ordered therapeutic visits for two younger children and held the mother in contempt.
The Second Department reinstated rent-stabilization fraud and rent-freeze claims because the landlord’s conclusory affidavit did not eliminate factual disputes over deregulation and registration practices.
The Second Department held that a deed-theft investigation is in good faith when it has a nontrivial factual basis and reasonable investigative steps, even without probable cause or proof of fraud.
The Second Department allowed tenants to amend a rent-overcharge class action to pursue the default formula under a newly supported regulatory theory.
The Second Department allowed a neighboring-property negligence claim after an oil spill and fire but dismissed conclusory theories and all claims against the LLC’s manager.
The Second Department reinstated strict products-liability claims because Honda did not eliminate factual disputes about an airbag system’s design, manufacture, and warnings.
The Second Department dismissed constructive-trust and duplicative claims where the complaint alleged no fiduciary relationship or reliance transfer involving the affiliate that received disputed contract funds.
The Second Department reinstated vicarious-liability claims against Uber entities because driver-control issues remained disputed, while finding the driver and vehicle owners liable for the rear-end crash.
The Second Department held that a Dutch bank’s passive receipt of a fraud-induced wire into a Netherlands account did not establish personal jurisdiction in New York.
The Second Department held that CPLR 3220’s post-offer “expenses” include attorney fees and affirmed an $11,473 award after the plaintiff recovered less than the defendant’s contract-damages offer.